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1. INTRODUCTION
Most tropical forests  are government-owned,  with timber  being harvested  under
concession  agreements  awarded  to private logging  companies. Those  agreements  tend to be
short-term  harvesting  licenses lasting  no more than one to a few years. In the absence of
regulation,  loggers  can be expected  to ignore the negative  environmental  impacts  of logging,  as
they derive  little or no financial  gain  from mitigating  them. Forestry departments  typically
impose  various logging  regulations  in an effort  to minimize  such impacts. Common  ones
include  minimum  diameter  cutting  limits, which  prohibit the felling  of trees below a specified
diameter,  and cutting  cycles, which  prohibit premature  reentry of logged-over  areas. Despite
such efforts, much evidence  indicates  that logging  practices  throughout  the tropics  are
undermining  the ability of tropical  forests  to sustain flows of timber and nontimber  benefits
(Poore  et al. 1989,  Panayotou  and Ashton 1992,  Johnson and Cabarle  1993, Sist et al. 1997).
The study presented  in this paper tests the empirical  significance  of several  common
recommendations  for promoting  better  logging  practices in tropical  forests: in particular,  making
concession  agreements  longer,  linking  renewal of those agreements  to logging  practices,  and
using  performance  bonds to encourage  compliance  with logging  regulations. It assesses  how
1these recommendations affect both the economics of timber harvesting and the provision of
environmental benefits.  Regarding the latter. it focuses on carbon sequestration and biodiversity.
It also examines the effects of timber fees and discount rates on economic and environmental
outcomes.
The study focuses on two aspects of logger behavior: choice of logging technology and
compliance with prescribed minimum diameter cutting limits.  Logging technology can be
viewed as ranging from highly damaging conventional logging at one extreme to "reduced
impact logging" (RIL) at the other.  RIL involves several distinct practices, including forest
mapping, planning the logging operation, careful construction of logging roads and skid trails,
climber cutting, directional felling, and minimal use of bulldozers (cf. Shahwahid et al. 1997).
The study analyzes loggers'  decisions about technology and cutting limits in two scenarios: (i)
the repeated harvesting of a given forest stand (virgin forest for the initial harvest, second-
growth forest for subsequent harvests), which occurs at a time delay of several decades (the
cutting cycle); and (ii) the sequential harvesting of an annual series of different forest stands
with identical characteristics (all virgin).  The former gets at issues of sustainable forest
management, while the latter gets at the mining of virgin timber stocks.  In this way, the study
examines both the long-run and short-run dynamics of logger behavior.
Long-term field data from actual logging operations spanning multiple cutting cycles
would be ideal for studying these issues. Unfortunately, such data do not exist in any tropical
country.  Although new field experiments can, and should, be set up (and indeed they are, by
such organizations as the Center for International Forestry Research and the Tropical Forest
Foundation), these experiments will not yield results for years to come.  As an alternative, this
study uses a simulation approach to analyze logger behavior.  Simulation is less directly
2grounded in datta  on actual behavior, but it complements field experiments by providing answers
to key po icv questions more quickly and by identifying areas of needed further research.
T!he  paper is organized as follows.  We begin by describing the models of forest growth
and logger behavior that comprise the simulation model.  The description of the forest growth
model includes the indicators used to predict the environmental impacts of logging, and the
descriptioin  of the model of logger behavior includes the regulatory instruments analyzed.  Next,
we present and discuss the simulation results, dealing with repeated harvesting and sequential
harvesting in turn.  In the final section we highlight the principal conclusions that can be drawn
from these results.
Ii. OVERVIEW  OF THE SIMULATION  MODEL
The forest growth model predicts recovery of the forest following logging.  It predicts both the
growth of residual (uriarvested)  trees and the recruitment (regeneration) of new trees.  It is
based on ani  unusually large data set from a 50-hectare research plot in a virgin rainforest in
Pasoh Forest Reserve in Negeri Sembilan, Peninsular Malaysia.  The plot, which the Forest
Research Ir stitute Malaysia established in 1985 (Manokaran et al. 1990), is, along with a sister
plot on Barro Colorado Island in Panama, the most intensively inventoried forest plot in the
tropics.  It lias been -inventoried  three times at five-year intervals, with data currently available
from the first two inventories.  Each inventory generates information on the species, dbh
(diameter a.t  breast height: 1.5 m above the forest floor), and spatial location of all free-standing,
woody sterns with a dbh > 1 cm,  The total number of stems in the plot is over 300,000,
representing more than 800 tree species.  The large number of individual trees, measured at
two points in time, permits the statistical estimation of equations predicting the annual diameter
3growth of individual species or groups of species. Although these equations are based on data
from a virgin forest, studies from similar forests elsewhere in Malaysia indicate that diameter
growth rates differ little between virgin and logged-over forests over the long term (Wan Razali
1988. Primack et al. 1987). There is thus reason to believe that the simulation model provides
reasonably accurate estimates of the forest's response to logging, despite being based on data
from an unlogged forest.
The model of logger behavior treats the logger as being solely interested in maximizing the
discounted sum of profits from logging.  The logger's  time horizon depends on the concession
context (repeated or sequential harvesting), the length of the concession agreement, the logger's
expectations about renewal of the agreement, and the logger's  discount rate.  The model predicts
the number and size of trees harvested and the logging technology employed.  Logging
technology affects the amount of logging damage: the number of trees destroyed (killed) by
logging.  A study by Griffin and Caprata (1977), which continues to be regarded as the most
reliable study on logging damage in Malaysia, was our source of information on logging damage
rates.
In sum, the model of logger behavior gives the objective to be maximized-the  discounted sum
of logging profits-and  the forest growth model gives the ecological constraints the logger faces.
Solving the overall simulation model involves determining the combination of harvest level (to
be precise, the number of trees in each species group) and logging technology that maximizes the
forner  without violating the latter, under a given set of logging regulations.
4III. THE FOREST  GROWTH  MODEL
Recruitment, growth. and mortalitY
Both the profitability of logging and the effectiveness of regulations in protecting
environmental attributes of the forest depend on how the forest responds to utilization (see
Figure 1).  For this study we adapted the forest growth model developed by Boscolo et al. (1997)
and modified by Boscolo and Buongiomo (1997).  This model predicts the recruitment, growth,
and mortality of individual trees in a representative hectare of the Pasoh plot, broken down by
species group and diameter class.  The model can be summarized as
y,,  = G [y, - h, - (I - 2/30))Dh,]  + c,  [1]
where y,  [y.,] is a I x mn vector indicating the number of trees of species group i (= 1,  m)
and diameter class j  (= 1, **n*  n) alive at time t; h,  [h=,]  is a vector of the same dimension
indicating the number of trees of species group i and diameter class1 harvested at time t; G is a
mn x mn matrix of growth (and, implicitly, mortality) and c is a 1 x mn vector of recruitment
parameters; D is a mn x mn matrix of logging damage parameters; and c) is a parameter related to
logging technology (0 = conventional logging, 1 = RIL).  This expression indicates that the state
of the forest at a given time depends on the state of the forest before harvest, the extent of timber
removals (harvest plus damage), the number of years since the last harvest, and the growth and
recruitment parameters in G and c.
To enhance the tractability of the model, Boscolo et al. (1997) aggregated the hundreds of
species in the Pasoh plot into three groups: dipterocarps (species in the family Dipterocarpaceaet
which dominates the rainforests of Southeast Asia; denoted henceforth as D), other commercial
species (0),  and noncommercial species (N).  They further aggregated individual trees in these
5groups into seven  1  0-cm diameter classes.  Table 1 shows the structure of an average hectare in
the initial virgin stand by species group and diameter class according to three standard forestry
measures: number of trees, basal area (the sum of the cross-sectional areas of tree trunks at breast
height), and timber volume net of defect.  Note that dipterocarps account for most of the large-
diameter trees and, consequently. most of the timber volume.  Boscolo et al. (1997) provide a
detailed description of the estimation of the recruitment, growth, and mortality parameters for
these species groups and diameter classes.  Appendix I provides a summary description.
Logging damage
Through the damage matrix D, the model reflects the fact that harvesting operations
damage the residual stand, especially small trees that are killed by the felling and skidding of
crop trees (Boscolo and Buongiorno 1997).2 The elements of this matrix, d,, are the number of
small trees (dbh = 10-20 cm) of species i killed by harvesting a tree of sizej.  The parameters d.
were calibrated by assuming that the felling of all commercial trees above 60 cm would kill half
the trees in the 10-20 cm dbh class.  This assumption was based on information in Griffin and
Caprata (1977), which indicated that the 10-20 cm class suffers the highest rate of damage
among dbh classes > 10 cm.  Based on a study of RIL in east Malaysia by Pinard et al. (1995),
we assumed that full implementation of RIL (c  = 1) would reduce damage in this class by two-
thirds.
Specified this way, the model fails to account for damage to both larger trees (dbh > 20
cm) and seedlings and saplings (dbh < 10 cm).  This is the most serious shortcoming of the
model.  As shown in Table 2, damage rates are high in these diameter classes, although not as
6high as in the 10-20 cm class.  The minimum commercial log diameter in Peninsular Malaysia is
on the order of 30 cm dbh. and so damage to trees with dbh > 20 cm can represent the loss of
significant amounts of valuable timber.  Seedlings and saplings are the trees that constitute the
future forest. and so damage to trees with dbh < 10 cm diminishes the sustainabilitv of timber
harvests and environmental benefits.
The narrow definition of logging damage thus causes the simulation model to understate
the economic and environmental benefits of improved logging practices.  To the extent that
improved practices reduce damage to potential crop trees, their adoption would in reality have a
less negative impact on loggers'  profits than the model predicts.  This implies, for instance, that
performance bonds would not need to be nearly as large in practice to induce loggers to adopt
RIL as the model predicts.  The omission of damage to the 0-10 cm class is especially serious.
Studies other than Griffin and Caprata (1977), which provided no damage estimates for this
class, indicate that it is the class that suffers the highest rate of damage (Borhan et al. 1987,
Pinard and Putz 1996). Some studies suggest that significant damage to commercial-sized trees
might be unavoidable even under RIL (Sist et al. 1997).
Environmental indicators
With some manipulation, predictions from the forest growth model can be used to predict
the impact of logging on carbon storage and stand diversity.  Carbon storage refers to the amount
of carbon stored in the biomass of living trees.  It includes both above-ground and below-ground
biomass.  It is given by
CS,=  k y,  [2]
2 In Indonesia,  Sist  et al. (1997) report that  skidding  is the harvesting  operation  mainly  responsible  for killing  trees,
while felling  primarily  injures  trees. Injured  trees  do, however,  experience  a higher  rate of mortality  than  trees that
are not injured  (Pinard  and Putz 1996).
7where k is a vector of carbon coefficients from Boscolo, Buongiorno and Panayotou (1997).  In
estimating the coefficients. Boscolo. Buongiorno, and Panayotou assumed that above-ground
biomass is twice the mass of standing timber (Brown et al. 1989), below-ground biomass is 10
percent of above-ground biomass (Whitmore and Burnham 1984), and the carbon content of
biomass is 50 percent.  Table 3 shows the coefficients.
Left undisturbed, a natural forest tends to approach a steady state, generally referred to as
the climax state (Ricklefs and Schluter 1993, Rosenzweig 1995). As already mentioned, the
virgin forest at Pasoh is extremely diverse in terms of tree species.  The level of diversity in the
virgin forest provides a useful standard for measuring diversity in the logged-over forest
(Boscolo and Buongiorno 1997).3 As an operational definition of diversity. we constructed a
proximity to climax index (PCI). equal to 1 minus the root mean squared deviation:
j2(y,,o  Bi -y111B1)2
PCI,Z  B_ )  [3]
l  yi' o B,  )2
B, is the basal area of a tree in diameter class  y,.o is the number of trees in species group i and
diameter class1 in the virgin forest, and yi, is the corresponding number of trees t years after the
initial harvest in the virgin forest.  PCI equals 1 if the logged-over forest has the same structure
and composition as the virgin forest, and 0 if it is clearcut.  We weighted the number of trees by
basal area to place more weight on the large trees that are associated with virgin conditions and,
ecological studies suggest, high diversity of species other than trees.
3 The issue  of which  successional  stage  is the most diverse  in tropical  forests is a matter  of some  disagreement.
Ecologists  who define  diversity  as the number  of species  per unit area tend to conclude  that earlier successional
stages  are more diverse  than mature  phases. However,  ecologists  who define  diversity  as the number  of species  per
number  of individuals  tend to conclude  that mature  phases  are more  diverse.
8Basal area is itself a useful summary environmental indicator.  It is highly correlated with
biomass (thus, carbon) and crown cover (thus, protection of soil and habitat).  It is also simple to
measure.  It is a standard variable included in forest inventories, and it can be monitored easily
before and after logging.  For these reasons, the simulation model also predicts total basal area,
BA,=  yi,,  Bj  [4]
i.j
In the simulation  results,  we present  the three indicators  (CS, PCI, BA) in two forms: their
value before or after logging occurs in the virgin stand (e.g., PCIh,),  and the time required for the
indicator to recover to within 10 percent of its value in the virgin forest, assuming no further
logging occurs (e.g., T,,,  ,) 4 For example, since PCI = I in the virgin forest, T,,,(,  indicates the
number of years of undisturbed forest growth for pCI in the logged-over forest to reach 0.9.'
IV. THE  MODEL OF LOGGER  BEHAVIOR
Repeated harvesting
We model the representative logger as a forward-looking entrepreneur who, given a
particular regulatory environment, attempts to maximize the net present value (NPV) of logging
profits.  In the absence of timber fees and other regulations, the logger's  objective function for
repeated harvesting is defined as
7'
NPV =  2,  E  [(Pi,  - C,) hij,  - FC  - co  FRL]6  [5]
1=0  i..
where p. is the market value of the logs in a tree of species group i and diameter classj,  C  is the
variable cost of felling a tree in diameter classj  and transporting logs from that tree to the market
4  We are indebted  to Ken Chomitz  for  this suggestion.
9point (a mill or port). F  is the fixed cost of conventional logging, F,  is the additional fixed cost
associated with full implementation of RIL. and 6, is the discount factor  =  i/(I-r>  wvrhere  r is
the discrete discount rate).  The logger can choose to adopt RIL fully (C,)  = 1 or partially (0 <  )
< 1). Note that RIL is modeled as affecting only the fixed cost of loggirng  and that the value of o
is the same for all harvests.
According to expression [1], reduced logging damage is the sole beneficial effect of RIL
in the model.  l[n  the absence of regulations, the logger's incentive to adopt RIL thus depends on
the weight the logger places on the resulting increase in the future harvest of secon1i-grov4h
timber. which in turn depends on the logger's discount rate and the terms of the concession
agreement.  Regarding the forner,  we varied the discount rate from l percent to I C'  percent.
Regarding the latter. the logger has a private incentive to adopt RMTL  only in the re-p.eated
harvesting scenario, because the sequential harvesting scenario does not include seocnd-growth
harvests.
Table 4-  presents the data on p,, and c,  used in the model.  We drew these data f-rom  ITTO
and FRIM (1994).  The table also shows estimates of the variable stumpage value, the difference
between market value of harvested logs and the variable logging cost.  Note the much highler
values for dipterocarps.  We set Fc equal to $800/ha (Vincent 1990, ITTO and FPIM 1994) and
FUL  equal to $135/ha (Putz and Pinard 1993).
For simrrplicity,  we held the values of pj,  cj,  Fc, and FRJL  constant .in  real terms over time.
This is obviously a strong assumption.  Although the average price of trepical logs in real U.S.
dollars has not changed much over the past few decades (FAO 1990), many specids that  were
noncommercial in the 1  970s have since become marketable.  Technological advances have
10tended to reduce the cost of logging in a given forest type and terrain. and fixed costs are often
lower in a previously logged stand than in a virgin stand. as some logging infrastructure might
already be in place.  We discuss some implications of these deviations between the model and
reality in the final section of this paper.
With the objective defined as above, the logger's  problem is to determine when to harvest
(the cutting cycle, 1), which species groups and size classes to harvest (h), and which logging




y,_ =G  [y, - h  - (1 - 2/30))Dh,]  + c,  (forest growth model)
f=0  if  t￿kxl  (k =  O, ...,T/l)
h,, FC.  FRIL  q  (harvest schedule)
(.  0  if  t = kxl
h, + (I - 2/30)) Dh, < y,  (harvest restriction)
yO  = condition of virgin stand  (initial conditions)
X, h > 0  (non-negativity constraints)
We set the projection period (T) equal to 60 years and defined the cutting cycle (1)  to the nearest
decade.  Hence, the set of feasible cutting cycles was 10, 20, 30, and 60 years.  Sixty years is the
approximate amount of time required for a seedling in Malaysian forests to develop into a timber
tree with a dbh of 50-60 cm (the rotation age). k, a series of integers ranging from 0 to T/l,
denotes the first, second, etc. harvest occurring during the 60-year period.
Sequential harvesting
Let ,i) denote the profit from the initial harvest in the virgin forest:
117  =  E  (Pj - C,) hi,,,  - F(  - X  FRIL  [61
i.  j
Then the logger's NPV in the case of  inregulated sequential harvesting is
NPV  =  7to  +  7tO/(l+r) +  . +  7co/(I+r)s
S=O
We use a different index, s instead of t. to emphasize that the time increment is one year, not one
felling cycle, and that with the passage of time the logger moves from one stand to another, not
back to the same stand.
The only forest-related constraints that now matter to the logger are the last three from
above,
ho  + (I - 2/3c0)  Dho < Yo  (harvest restriction)
y= = condition of virgin stand  (initial conditions)
YOl  ho  2 0  (non-negativity constraints)
The dynamics in the sequential harvesting model come entirely from the terms included in the
summation;  sign in expression [7]. We will see shortly that these terms contain more than just
discounting factors when concession renewability is linked to logging performance.
Modeling timber fees, performance bonds, and renewal conditions
Incorporating timber fees, performance bonds, and renewability criteria into the model of
logger behavior is straightforward.  Regarding timber fees, an area charge (termed a "premium"
in Malaysia) of . $/ha changes the expression for per-hectare profits to
12,  (Pii  C,) hii,  - F,-  o FRIL  -T  [83
I.,
A per-tree royalty of T $/tree changes it to
E  (P;,-  C,- T)  hi, - F, - O FRIL  [9]
i.,
If we redefine p,., C, and h, 1, on a cubic meter basis, then T in this expression represents a volume-
based rovalty-  Finally, an ad valorem royalty of T percent of log price changes the profit
expression to
E  (TPi-  Cj) h,,-  FC  - FRIL  [10]
Royalties, whether per-tree. volume-based, or ad valorem, reduce the logger's profit
margin on individual trees.  As such, they can induce "high-grading" within the stand (Gillis
1980, 1992; Repetto and Gillis 1988): the failure to harvest trees of low-value species or with
small diameters, because the market value of the harvested logs is less than the sum of variable
logging costs and royalties.  The area charge has an analogous high-grading effect between
stands: if it is sufficiently high, it can discourage loggers from harvesting certain stands
altogether, because logging revenue is inadequate to cover the sum of fixed and variable logging
costs and the area charge.5
A performance bond is a mandatory deposit that the logger makes with the forestry
department before logging.  If the logger complies with all applicable regulations, then the
department reimburses him the full amount of the deposit.  If the logger fails to comply with
certain regulations, however, the department keeps some or all of the deposit
5  Royalties  can also induce  high-grading  between  stands.
13The Peninsular Malaysia Forestry Department does not currently use performance bonds,
but in principle it and other forestry departments in tropical countries could use bonds to promote
better logging practices.  The Philippines has in fact experimented with their use (Paris, Ruzicka,
and Speechly 1994).  In the simulation model, if the forestry department wished to encourage
loggers to adopt RIL. it could levy a bond of $PB per hectare and make reimbursement
proportional to c).  This would change the profit per harvest to
E  (Pi,  - C,)h.,,  - Fc - OFRIL  - (I..O)PB,
1./
or
E  (P;,  - C/)hX7,  - FC  - PB + (O(PB  - FRIL)[1]
The effect is to reduce the cost of RIL to the logger from PB to PB - FRL
Similarly, if the department wished to encourage the logger to comply with a minimum
diameter cutting limit of, say, 60 cm, it could require a bond of
UPB E  YY,
i.j
where i includes only commercial species (the species that tempt the logger to violate the cutting
limit), and} ranges from dbh =30 cm (the minimum commercial log diameter) to dbh-60 cm (the
prescribed cutting limit).  yy,,  is thus the number of trees of commercial species below the
cutting limit. UPB, the unit performance bond, is in effect the "price" the department charges for
harvesting a commercial tree below the cutting limit. The logger can avoid paying this price by
not violating the limit, in which case he is reimbursed the full amount of the deposit.  The
inclusion of this type of performance bond alters the profit per harvest to
14(P,, -C)h ,-F(.-  FRL  - UPB  E  (y  _  [12]
where  is the number of commercial trees below the cutting limit before the harvest andy'.  is
the remaining number after the harvest.
][n  practice, performance bonds should be linked to variables that are easy to monitor and
verify, in order to reduce implementation costs and potential disagreements about the level of
reimbursement.  Determining whether a logger has adopted RIL might require costly, extended
site visits during all stages of the logging operation. 6 Few forestry departments in developing
countries have enough personnel to do such intensive monitoring.  Determining whether loggers
have complied with minimum diameter cutting limits is likely to be easier, particularly in
countries like Malaysia that conduct inventories of logging compartments before and after
felling.  Inventory data offer a direct, performance-based indicator of compliance with cutting
limits that does not have an obvious parallel in the case of RIL.
Linking renewal of the concession agreement to logger performance offers more leverage
over logger behavior in the sequential harvesting scenario, for the simple reason that the benefits
of renewal to the logger (i.e., profits from future harvests) are not discounted as many years as in
the repeated harvesting scenario.  Linking the probability of renewal to adoption of RIL changes
the logger's objective function under sequential harvesting to
s
sro  E~  [aJ)(1+r)]5  [13] S--
s=O
6 This  might  not  necessarily  be  the case  in all situations.  For  example,  two  critical  elements  that  characterize  RIL,
forest  mapping  and  planning  of roads  and  skid  trails,  could  be verified  by  reviewing  logging  plans  and making  a site
visit  to check  that  the  plans  have  been  implemented.
15S can be interpreted as the number of times a one-year agreement can be renewed.  Similarly,
linking the probability of renewal to compliance with minimum diameter cutting limits changes
the objective function to
S
7co  E[(Z  y',  /  y,,,)  (l±r)l,  [14]
s=O  i, Ij  ...
where, as in [12],j  runs from the minimum commercial log diameter to the cutting limit.
Interpretation of results for simulations involving [ 12] is made somewhat easier by
linking the bond to timber volume below the cutting limit instead of number of trees below the
limit.  Then, UPB is expressed in $/m3, the same units as the volume-based royalty.  We report
estimates of UPB in this form below.
V. RESULTS:  REPEATED  HARVESTING
For the case of repeated harvesting, we analyzed three sets of regulatory scenarios: no
regulations, royalties but no performance bonds, and performance bonds with and without
royalties.
No regulations
This scenario ignores timber fees and all other regulations, including minimum diameter
cutting limits.  It is equivalent to the logger having a 60-year, unconditional, nonrenewable lease.
At a 1O  percent discount rate, the profit-maximizing solution is to harvest twice, at the beginning
and the end of the period (i.e., in years 0 and 60).  The harvest intensity is at the maximum: the
logger harvests all the available dipterocarps and commercial nondipterocarps with dbh > 30 cm
at each harvest.  He extracts 74 m3/ha during the first harvest and 30 m3/ha during the second.
16He does so using conventional logging techniques.  We refer to this simulation as the baseline
simulation.
The logger's  behavior in this simulation is at odds with logging regulations in Peninsular
Malaysia. which prescribe minimum diameter cutting limits of 50-60 cm and a cutting cycle of
around 30 years for most forests.  The simulation results can be viewed either as confirming a
fundamental regulatory challenge facing the Peninsular Malaysia Forestry Department, for
loggers do indeed harvest all commercial trees when permitted to do so (e.g., during land
conversion), or as raising doubts about setting cutting limits so far above the minimum
commercial log diameter.  We will return to the latter point at the end of this section.
17Table 5 presents the simulation details.  The NPV is S4402/ha, which comes almost
entirely from the first harvest ($4398/ha).  The profit of $1136/ha from the second harvest
contributes little to the NPV, because of discounting. After the first harvest, the stand's
aggregate stumpage value is negative until year 35.  A lower fixed cost for harvests after the first
would make the stumpage value positive sooner and, if the reduction were large enough, would
make the profit-maximizing cutting cycle 30 years instead of 60 years. 7
The use of conventional logging techniques results in high rates of damage to trees in the
10-20 cm dbh class: 60.9 percent during the first harvest and 23.2 percent during the second.
Had the model also included damage to trees of commercial diameter, both harvests would have
been reduced by 20-40 percent, according to estimates in Griffin and Caprata (1977; see Table
2).  For this reason, the NPV predicted by the model overstates the NPV of actual logging
operations.
The high rates of damage, combined with the heavy harvesting, reduce all environmental
indicators significantly: BA is 60 percent lower immediately after the first harvest, CS is 64
percent lower, and PCI is 74 percent lower.  If the stand is left undisturbed after year 60, the
indicators recover, but at different rates (see Figures 2 and 3).  BA and CS recover most quickly,
reaching 90 percent of their virgin values (i.e., TBA  and Tcs) in 57 years and 43 years,
respectively.  After about a century, they level off at values comparable to those in the virgin
stand (see Figure 2).  pCI takes much longer to recover 90 percent of the virgin value (Tpcj), 129
years.  Even after one and a half centuries, it is still more than 5 percent below the virgin value
and appears to have leveled off, thus suggesting a permanent loss of diversity.  Had the model
7Recall  that we limited the choice of cutting  cycles to 10, 20, 30, and 60 years.
18included damage to trees in the 0-10 cm and 20-30 cm dbh classes, values of all indicators would
have been lower, and recovery times would have been longer.
Changing the discount rate from 1O  percent to 5 percent had no effect on harvest timing,
harvest intensity, logging technology, or, consequently, the environmental indicators.  This
reflects the fact that trees above 30 cm dbh appreciate in value terms by less than 5 percent per
year.  Hence, from a private standpoint, it is not economically desirable to leave them to grow in
the forest, even at a discount rate as low as 5 percent.  Harvest intensity changed only when we
reduced the discount rate to  1 percent.  Then, the profit-maximizing solution involved leaving
some dipterocarps of commercial size standing in the forest until the second harvest.  All other
commercial species above 30 cm were still harvested.  The reduction in the discount rate did not
affect harvest timing (still two harvests, in years 0 and 60) or logging technology (conventional
logging was still preferred).
The most important policy implication of these results is that converting concessions
from short-term harvest licenses to longer term agreements, to enable loggers to harvest the same
stand again in the future, is unlikely to induce loggers to adopt RIL or to comply with minimum
diameter cutting limits.  Additional regulations are required to achieve these objectives.
Royalties
Although royalty-induced high-grading is often described as a "problem" in the literature
on tropical timber concessions, it might not be undesirable when a forestry department wishes to
discourage loggers from violating minimum diameter cutting limits.  Table 6 shows "threshold"
values for the three royalties: the highest values (to the nearest $5 or 5 percent) they can have
without inducing high-grading.  The volume-based royalty had no impact on logging decisions
for values up to $35/m 3: the logger continued to harvest all trees of commercial species with dbh
19> 30 cm, using conventional logging techniques. in years 0 and 60.  Only when the royalty
exceeded this level (results not shown) did it affect harvest intensity, causing the logger to forgo
harvesting some medium-sized commercial nondipterocarps.  However, the logger still preferred
conventional logging. At even higher levels, fewer and fewer trees were harvested.  For
example, at $60/m 3, only dipterocarps above 40 cm were harvested.
Because an increase in the volume-based royalty has the same impact on the logger's
profit function as an identical increase in the variable logging cost, these results can also be
interpreted as indicating the effect of transportation costs on logging decisions.  Anecdotal
evidence from various countries indicates that harvests do indeed tend to be less intensive in
forests that are further from a mill or port.  For an example from Bolivia. see Rice et al. (1997).
By lowering transportation costs, the construction of new and improved roads can be expected to
increase the extraction of less valuable species and smaller diameter classes.
Table 6 shows that logging profit is positive for both harvests at the $35/m3 royalty.  For
royalties of $50/m 3 and higher, however, the profit for the second harvest is below zero.  This
indicates that the profit-maximizing cutting cycle is longer than 60 years: the logger will not
harvest until the trees are even larger and more valuable.  The introduction of the royalty thus
tends to lengthen the cutting cycle. 8 It also tends to discourage the adoption of RIL.  As
mentioned earlier, RIL benefits the logger by reducing logging damage and thereby raising
future stocks of harvestable timber.  Higher royalties reduce the profits from future harvests and
thus reduce the financial incentive to adopt RIL.  Hence, it is not surprising that conventional
logging remains the preferred logging technology in all the royalty simulations.
This is a standard forest economics result.
20The per-tree royalty works even more directly as a disincentive against violating
minimum diameter cutting limits. High-grading began once the royalty exceeded $20/tree.  At
$50/tree, the logger did not harvest dipterocarps below 40 cm dbh and other commercial species
below 50 cm dbh.
The ad valorem royalty induced high-grading only if it exceeded 65 percent, but at this
high level it made logging unprofitable during the second harvest.  This result illustrates that the
royalties affect the allocation of stumpage value between the logger and the government in
different ways.  For a given amount of high-grading, the per-tree royalty generates the least
government revenue, and the ad valorem royalty generates the most.9 During the first harvest,
the $20 per-tree royalty generates only a third as much revenue as the $35/m 3 volume-based
royalty and a fifth as much as the 65 percent ad valorem royalty.
We did not run specific simulations for the area charge, as its effects are clear from
inspecting expression [8].  Its maximum value is determined by the logging profit per harvest.
Thus, for example, in the absence of royalties the forestry department could levy an area charge
up to $4398/ha for the first harvest and $11  36/ha for the second (Table 5). Higher values would
destroy the financial viability of logging. Because the area charge is levied on a per-hectare
basis, it does not affect marginal logging decisions.  It therefore cannot be used to discourage
violations of minimum diameter cutting limits.  But by reducing profits from future harvests, it
does discourage the adoption of RIL.
Performance bonds
9 This  again  is a standard  result. See  Gillis  (1980, 1992)  and  Repetto  and  Gillis  (1988).
21In contrast to timber fees. performance bonds can be used to induce the logger both to
adopt RIL and to comply with minimum diameter cutting limits.  When the discount rate is high
and the cutting cycle is decades-long, the benefit to the logger of adopting RIL-i.e.,  the present
value of increased profits from higher future harvests-is  negligible.  Then, the impact of the
performance bond on adoption of RIL can be analyzed by considering expression [I I] applied to
just the initial harvest in the virgin forest.  There is no need to run simulations.  From inspecting
the expression, it is obvious that the bond, PB, must just marginally exceed the incremental cost
of RIL, FRIL  (= $13 5/ha), to induce the logger to adopt RIL.  If instead the benefit of RIL to the
logger is not negligible (e.g., if the logger's discount rate is very low), then the value of PB that
induces the adoption of RIL can be less than FRIL.
The bond must be considerably higher to induce compliance with the minimum diameter
cutting limits.  In the simulations, the value of UPB in expression [12] ranged from $55/m3 for a
cutting limit of 40 cm. to $70/m3 for 50 cm and $85/m3 for 60 cm.  Table 7 shows these and
additional results.  The corresponding performance bonds (= UPB y y,,) were $492/ha,
$1241/ha, and $2386/ha, respectively. The UPBs and performance bonds are so high because of
the substantial timber values below the cutting limits.  They increase with the cutting limit
because stumpage values are higher for larger diameter trees (Table 4), and thus a larger
penalty" is needed to discourage the logger from violating the limit.  Such high deposits  -up
to three times the fixed cost of conventional logging - could well be infeasible in developing
countries with poorly developed credit markets.
In those situations, the use of performance bonds might need to be limited to inducing the
adoption of RIL.  But as noted earlier, linking a performance bond to CO  is likely to be more
difficult in practice than linking it to timber volumes.  Is there any way to design a bond linked to
22timber volumes that induces the logger to adopt RIL?  At first glance. the simulation results in
Table 7 suggest that the answer is no: even at the very high UPB values in the table, the logger
still selects conventional logging.  This result is not surprising: the difference between Y,,  andy
in expression [12] is the amount of timber below the cutting limit that the logger harvests, and so
UPB is behaving just  like a royalty.
If, however, we redefine the lower limit of1 in the performance bond portion of
expression [12] from 30 cm dbh (the minimum commercial log diameter) to 10 cm dbh (the
lower limit of the diameter classes that suffer logging damage), then a single bond based on
timber volume below the cutting limit can achieve both objectives.  Table 8 shows the simulation
results.  A bond of $5  1  /m3 induces compliance with the 40 cm cutting limit.  This is less than the
$55/m 3 when the lower limit of  is 30 cm (in Table 7), because violating the limit and felling the
30-40 diameter class is now associated with foregoing both the reimbursement of the bond
deposited for both the 3  0-40 cm class and for the damage to the 10-20 cm class.
Raising the bond only slightly, from $51/m3 to $56/m3, induces the adoption of RIL.  The
incremental cost of the bond to the logger, $5/M3 times the timber volume in the 10-40 cm dbh
classes (18.9 m3/ha), is smaller than the incremental cost of RIL ($135/ha).  The reason is that
the logger now reaps an immediate benefit from RIL: by damaging less timber in the 10-20 cm
class, he recovers more of the bond.  Increasing the bond further induces compliance with 50 cm
and then 60 cm cutting limits, while maintaining the incentive to adopt RIL.  On a per hectare
basis, the bonds for these cutting limits are very large, $1906-3432/ha, but the logger is
reimbursed nearly the full value of the bond.
Environmental indicators
23Figures 4-6 show the environmental benefits, in non-monetary terms, of RIL and the
cutting limits.  They show how the environmental indicators recover after the initial logging in
the virgin forest, assuming no further logging occurs.  The figures for BA and CS are similar.  In
both cases, RIL provides relatively larger environmental benefits than the cutting limits.  For
example, the adoption of RIL raises carbon storage immediately after logging by approximately
50 tons/ha, from about 80 tons/ha under conventional logging to just under 130 tons/ha for RIL.
Compliance with the cutting limits raises carbon storage further, but by lesser amounts.  The
difference between RIL with no cutting limit (just under 130 tons/ha) and RIL with the highest
cutting limit (just over 160 tons/ha) is not much more than 30 tons/ha.
The values of BA and CS in the different regulatory scenarios converge after about 100
years. As they do, the relative gaps between them remain about the same. The trends for PCI are
different.  The initial impacts of RIL and cutting limits on this indicator are similar to those for
BA and C,:  the adoption of RIL raises PCI by about 0.20, while compliance with the 60 cm
cutting limit raises it by less than another 0.1.  But the gap between the values of pCI for RIL
with no cutting limit and conventional logging closes within 50 years after logging, much sooner
than in the case of BA and CS.  Why?  Recall that the sole ecological impact of RIL in the model
is to reduce logging damage in the 10-20 cm class.  Adoption of RIL causes a larger number of
trees to be retained in this class.  In the absence of cutting limits, this has a relatively large initial
impact on pCI, because all trees of commercial species above 30 cm are removed.  But this
impact is diluted as time passes and recruitment into the 0-10 cm class, which is not affected by
RIL, occurs.  Figures 4 and 5 do not show as rapid convergence for BA and CS because these
indicators are, in contrast to pCI, simple sums across all diameter classes.  The distribution of
trees across  diameter  classes affects  pCI, but not BA and CS.
24The environmental benefits generated by adoption of RIL and compliance with minimum
diameter cutting limits come at a cost, namely a loss in timber value.  The last column of Table 8
shows that, at a 10 percent discount rate, the sum of the logger's  NPV and the present value of
governrnent revenue is 40 percent lower ($1  743/ha) under the "environmentally friendly"
combination of RIL and a 60 cm cutting limit than under unregulated conventional logging.  The
cutting limit is responsible for most of the loss: it prevents the logger from harvesting all the
trees that are financially mature at the time of the initial harvest.  The question from an economic
standpoint is whether the incremental environmental benefits associated with minimum diameter
cutting limits are worth the loss of so much timber value.  We cannot answer this question, as we
did not attempt to value the benefits associated with higher levels of BA, CS, and pCI.  We can
conclude, however, that minimum diameter cutting limits are not justified on the basis of timber
values alone. 0
VI. RESULTS: SEQUENTIAL HARVESTING
No regulations
In the baseline case for sequential harvesting (no regulations), the logger's behavior is
exactly the same as during the initial harvest in the baseline case for repeated harvesting (Table
5): the logger harvests all trees of commercial species and sizes using conventional logging.
Lengthening the agreement (raising S) has no impact on behavior, nor does lowering the logger's
discount rate.  As noted earlier, the logger has no incentive whatsoever to adopt RIL under
'°  Some  tropical  foresters  have  also  questioned  the  silvicultural  basis  for  minimum  diameter  cutting  limits in
dipterocarp  forests,  noting that  seedlings  of the  commercially  most  desirable  dipterocarp  species  are  light-
demanding  and thus  grow  more  vigorously  if more  of the  canopy  is removed.  See Appanah  and  Weinland  (1990).
25sequential harvesting.  With no prospect of a harvest in the second-growth forest, the logger
likewise has no incentive to retain small-diameter commercial trees in the forest to grow, even at
a discount rate of zero.
Perfobrmance-based  renewal. performance bonds, and timber fees
Making the probability of renewal of the concession agreement proportional to (0, as in
expression [13]. is on its own sufficient to induce the logger to adopt RIL.  This is true even
when renewal is for just  one additional year, that is when S = 1: a two-year agreement, with
renewal for the second year contingent on performance during the first year. The profit from
harvesting a new virgin stand is so great that the logger is more than willing to secure the
opportunity by incurring the extra $135/ha in fixed logging costs associated with RIL.
For similar reasons, the introduction of performance-based renewal conditions reduces
the size of performance bonds required to induce compliance with minimum diameter cutting
limits.  Table 9 summarizes the results of simulations in which the performance bond was linked,
as in [ 14], to the volume of timber in trees of commercial species with dbh between the
minimum commercial log diameter (i.e., 30 cm, not 10 cm) and the minimum diameter cutting
limits.  In the absence of timber fees and with no prospect of renewal (S = 0), the UPB had to be
$85/M 3 to induce compliance with a minimum diameter cutting limit of 60 cm, $70/m3 for 50
cm, and $55/m3 for 40 cm-the  same as in Table 7 for repeated harvesting.  The values actually
differ slightly, due to the fact that the repeated harvesting model includes future harvests in the
second-growth forest, but at a 10 percent discount rate the differences are negligible.
Setting S = 1-just  one renewal year - caused the UPB for the 60 cm cutting limit to
drop by more than half, to $38/m3. For the 50 cm and 40 cm cutting limits, no bond was
required at all (UPB = 0): the performance-based renewal condition was adequate to induce
26compliance on its own.  Extending the agreement to S = 2 made the renewal condition adequate
on its own for even the 60 cm cutting limit.
We analyzed interactions among renewal conditions, performance bonds. and timber fees
for three fees: an area charge, a volume-based royalty, and an ad valorem royalty.  We set the
fees at levels that generated identical amounts of government revenue when other regulations,
including renewal conditions, were absent.  Results for the area charge (= $ 1479/ha) were
identical to results for the case of no fees.  The introduction of royalties, however, reduced the
UPB, especially for S = 0.  With no possibility of renewal, the volume-based royalty (= $20/m3)
reduced the UPB for the 60 cm cutting limit from $85/m 3 to $65/m3, while the ad valorem
royalty (= 23 percent of log price) reduced it slightly more, to $62/m3. Differences in the high-
grading effects of the two royalties reversed the relative impact in the case of the 40 cm cutting
limit, as the volume-based royalty generated the larger reduction (to $35/m3 vs. $38/M 3).
Introducing renewal conditions as in [14], with S = 1, diminished the impact of the
royalties on the UPB for the 60 cm cutting limit. The UPB fell from $38/m3 in the absence of
fees, to $34/m 3 in the presence of the volume-based royalty and $32/m 3 in the presence of the ad
valorem royalty.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The principal conclusions of this study can be summarized as follows:
1.  Due to the effects of discounting, longer concessions provide little incentive for loggers to
adopt RIL or to comply with minimum diameter cutting limits.
272.  Royalties can be used to encourage compliance with minimum diameter cutting limits, but
they discourage adoption of RIL.  The types of royalties that are more effective in
encouraging compliance with minimum diameter cutting limits (e.g., per-tree royalties) tend
to be less effective as revenue instruments.
3.  Relatively small performance bonds can be used to induce loggers to adopt RIL, but very
large bonds are needed to induce compliance with minimum diameter cutting limits.
4.  RIL and minimum diameter cutting limits both have significant, positive impacts on
environmental indicators related to carbon storage and biodiversity.  In the case of minimum
diameter cutting limits, however, the environmental benefits are obtained at the cost of a
substantial reduction in the timber value of the stand.
5.  Performance-based renewal conditions provide a powerful incentive for loggers to adopt RIL
and to comply with minimum diameter cutting limits.  This is the case even when concession
agreements are very short (only 1-2 renewal years).
6.  Performance-based renewal conditions sharply reduce the size of the performance bond
needed to induce compliance with minimum diameter cutting limits.  Royalties, but not area
charges, have a similar, though weaker, effect.
Nlost of the simulation results reported in this paper indicate that loggers prefer longer,
rather than shorter, cutting cycles.  On the surface, this appears to be inconsistent with anecdotal
evidence about loggers' behavior in many tropical countries: that they harvest the logged-over
forest sooner than the prescribed cutting cycle.  This is the issue of premature reentry.  But note
that the simulation model predicts that long cutting cycles are preferrred when the logger is
permitted to harvest intensively during the initial harvest  When this is not the case-for
28example. when we impose regulations that induce compliance with minimum diameter cutting
limits (Tables 7 and 8)-the  model predicts shorter cutting cycles.  This simply confirms that
commercial-sized timber left standing in the forest tempts the logger to reenter the forest to
harvest it. as it is already financially mature.
This temptation is heightened if log prices rise, transportation costs fall. or more species
become marketable-all  of which have occurred in Peninsular Malaysia since the early 1  970s.  It
is also heightened if. contrary to the assumptions of the simulation model, fixed logging costs are
lower in logged-over forests than in the virgin forest.  To investigate these issues, we ran a
simulation without timber fees or performance bonds in which the fixed logging cost fell from
$800/ha at the first harvest to $400/ha for subsequent harvests and the minimum diameter cutting
limit was enforced only for the first harvest. The logger's  profit-maximizing decision under
these conditions was to extract 46 m3/ha during the initial harvest, thus earning a profit of
$2766/ha, and then to reenter the stand in 10 years, to extract an additional 34 m3/ha and to earn
an additional profit of $1  700/ha. That is, the decision mirrored the premature reentry behavior
observed in tropical forests.  This result suggests that minimum diameter cutting limits that
exceed minimum commercial log diameters, when combined with weak control over access to
logged-over forests, are a principal cause of premature reentry.
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32Appendix I: The forest growth model
In the rmodel  developed by Boscolo et al. ( 1997). the structure of the forest stand is represented
by the vector  =  [y..l]  where  ,  is the number of trees per hectare of species group i (i  1
m) in diameter classy (j = 1,  n) at time t.  The harvest at time t is given by the vector h, = [h.j,
].  Changes in stand structure over time are determined by a system of dynamic equations,
y,,,,+,  =  (y,,,,  - hi,.,)  ai, 1 +  Ij
yj.z,+j  =  (yi.,,,  - hi,,.,) bi, 2 +  (yi.2.1-  h,2,)  ai, 2
Yi.3.,-1  =  (yi.2.- hi. 2.,)  bj, 3 +  (yi,  - hi.3,) a,3
Yi,.OU  (,,,  hn/  bi.,,+  yi-ar  aix/.(1
where a,,, is the probability that a live tree in diameter class1 at time t will still be alive and in
that class at time t+l,  b,i is the probability that a live tree in diameter class X l at time t will move
up to class  at time t+l,  and I, is recruitment, or ingrowth (the number of trees that enter the
smallest diameter class between t and t+l).  As indicated, the model assumes that the transition
probabilities (the parameters a ,, and b,,j)  are independent of stand state, but it assumes that
ingrowth depends on stand density and composition.  Ingrowth for a given species group is a
positive function of the number of trees of that species present in the stand (and thus providing
seed) and a negative function of total basal area of the stand (which captures the effect of
competition):
Ii.r  =aR  +i  (  E  B (yqj -hi.j) +y  (jt  h;>,,  (2)
i=I  j=1  J=1
where BJ  is the basal area of a tree in diameter classj.
In matrix form, the model is formulated as (Buongiorno and Michie 1980)
33y,_ 1 = G(y, - h)  c,  (3)
where
FG,  IC
G=  GI  c=
and
a,Fi  I
G.  =Ib  a,  I  C.=
1 l
b,,  a,,  o
Transition probabilities are usually estimated, straightforwardly. as the proportions of trees that
stay in the same diameter class or move up to the next one during a given time interval (method I
of Michie and Buongiorno 1984). This method has been applied extensively (see Mendoza and
Setyarso 1986, Osho 1991).  When applied to the Pasoh dataset. however, it generated steady-
states that were unrealistic.  For example, some diameter classes had a negative number of trees.
Boscolo et al. (1997) addressed this problem by using an approach similar to one used by Ingram
and Buongiorno (1996) for a lowland tropical forest in Malaysia and Houde and Ledoux (1995)
for natural forest stands in Guyana.  They assumed that the upgrowth parameters (the b,,,s)  from
the Pasoh censuses were representative of long-term values, while mortality rates (which affect
the ajjs) were below long-run values.  These are reasonable assumptions, as: (i) diameter growth
can be estimated more accurately than mortality, (ii) growth rates based on the Pasoh date are
consistent with ones from other growth and yield studies in Peninsular Malaysia, and (iii)
windstorms, which occur occasionally in the vicinity of Pasoh and represent a source of
catastrophic mortality, did not occur between the two censuses.  If a further assumption is made
34that the plot is in a steady state (i.e.. at its ecological climax), then the a, s can be estimated from
the equations,
a,,  =  .(js  -Yi*,s)/1Y  ,s
aj.2 =  Yi  2s -y, ,5 bi.)/ YY  2s
ai.,= (yins  -yin-.s bin)/  Yn  (4)
which imply mortality rates of m,  =  1 - aij - bij  j  Table A.  1 shows the final transition
probabilities used in the matrix model.
The transition probabilities are independent of stand state under this approach, but ingrowth is
not.  To estimate the effects of stand density and composition on ingrowth (equation (2)), the plot
was divided into 50 subplots of one hectare each.  Table A.2 shows estimation results for the
ingrowth equations.  All coefficients had the expected signs: i.e., ingrowth in each species group
was influenced positively by the number of trees in that group and negatively by total basal area.
The coefficients of determination varied between 0.9 and 0.32, so the model did not explain most
of the variability in ingrowth.  The coefficients on the independent variables were, however,
statistically significant at the 5% level in all three equations.
35Table 1. Structure of an average hectare in the virgin forest.
Diameter  Trees (no.)  Basal area (M2 )  Net volume* (m
3 )
class
(cm)  D  0  N  Total  D  0  N  Total  D  0  N  Total
10-20  30.5  61.5  262.3  354.2  0.5  1.1  4.6  6.3  1.7  3.5  15.0  20.2
20-30  11.6  17.5  61.5  90.7  0.6  0.9  3.0  4.5  1.9  2.8  9.8  14.5
30-40  5.4  8.9  19.8  34.1  0.5  0.9  1.9  3.3  3.4  5.6  12.4  21.3
40-50  3.9  4.6  7.2  15.8  0.6  0.7  1.1  2.5  4.0  4.8  7.4  16.3
50-60  3.6  3.1  2.9  9.5  0.9  0.7  0.7  2.3  5.6  4.8  4.5  14.7
60-70  2.5  1.7  0.9  5.2  0.8  0.6  0.3  1.7  8.1  5.5  2.9  16.8
70+  5.9  1.6  0.9  8.4  3.0  0.8  0.5  4.2  25.4  6.9  3.9  36.2
Total  63.5  98.9  355.4  517.8  6.9  5.6  12.1  24.7  50.1  33.8  55.9  140.0
D = dipterocarp, 0 =  other commercial species, N = noncommercial species.
* Timber volume net of defect.Table 2.  Estimates of logging damage rates from selected studies.
Conventional logging  RIL  Damage definition  Source
48.4%  30.5%  Injured or killed, dbh > 10 cm*  Sist et al. (1997)
17-57%  2-22%  Killed, 1-60 cm  Pinard and Putz (1996)
3.5-10%  3.5-10%  Injured (snapped-off)
41%  15%  Killed, 5-60 cm.*  Pinard et al. (1995)
20%  > 60 cm  Griflin and Caprata (1977)
30%  45-59.9 cm
40%  30-44.9 cim
50%  15-29.9 cm
69%  15-30 cm  Canonizado (1978, cited in
64%  30-50 cm  Appanah and Weinland, 1990)
8-21%**  Stem and crown damage;  Borhan et al. (1987)
unclear if killed trees included
* Undifferentiated by size class.
**  Using tractor/skidder for hauling.Table 3. Estimates of carbon  storage per tree (above-ground  and  below-ground  biomass combined).
dbh  Carbon storage (tollns/t-ee)
(cm)
D  0  N
10-20  0.24  0.24  0.27
20-30  0.32  0.32  0.35
30-40  0.60  0.60  0.66
40-50  0.86  0.85  0.94
50-60  1.17  1.15  1.28
60-70  2.58  2.54  2.83
70+  3.54  3.49  3.88
D  dipterocarp, 0  other commercial species, N  noncommercial species.
Source: Boscolo and Buongiorno (1997).Table 4.  Estimates of log prices, variable logging costs, and stumpage values per tree (1991 prices).
Net  Ex-mill log price  Variable logging cost  Stumpage value
dbh  volume  ($/tree)  ($/tree)  ($/tree)
(cm)  (m3/tree)  D  O-  N  DO  N  D  0f  N
15  0.057  0  0  0  0  00
25  0.160  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
35  0.625  45  33  0  -11  -11  -I  34  __  -I
45  1.034  90  66  0  -18  -18  -2  72  48  -2
55  1.544  157  116  0  -26  -26  -3  131  90  -3
65  3.235  330  243  0  -55  -55  -6  275  188  -6
75  4.307  439  323  0  -73  -73  -9  366  250  -9
D = dipterocarp, 0 = other commercial species, N  noncommercial species.
Sources: Volume equations from Awang Noor, Vincent, and Hadi (1992); average prices and logging costs from ITTO and FRIM
(1994).  Logging costs include transportation costs.  Ratio of fixed costs to total costs from Vincent (1990).  Fixed costs are estimated
at $800/ha, which assumes an average harvest of 50m3/ha. Variable costs are estimated at $17/m 3.Table 5. Repeated harvesting: logging behavior in the absence of regulations (10 percent discount rate).
Year  Aggregate  Logging  Harvest  Logging  BA  BA  CS  C'S  PCI  PCI
stumpage  profit  volume  damage  before  after  before  after  before  after
value  ($/ha)  (m3/ha)  (%)  logging  logging  logging  logging  logging  logging
($/ha)  (m2/ha)  (m2/ha)  (tons/ha)  (tons/ha)
0  4398  4398  74  60.9  24.7  10.1  214  77  1.00  0.26
5  -690  0  0  0.0  10.9  - 92  - 0.34  -
10  -572  0  0  0.0  11.8  - 106  - 0.40  -
15  -470  0  0  0.0  12.7  - 118  - 0.44  -
20  -348  0  0  0.0  13.6  - 130  - 0.47  -
25  -213  0  0  0.0  14.5  - 140  - 0.50  -
30  -63  0  0  0.0  15.4  - 149  - 0.52  -
35  103  0  0  0.0  16.3  - 158  - 0.53  -
40  285  0  0  0.0  17.1  - 166  - 0.54  -
45  480  0  0  0.0  17.9  - 173  - 0.56  -
50  689  0  0  0.0  18.7  - 179  - 0.57  -
55  908  0  0  0.0  19.5  - 185  - 0.58  -
60  1136  1136  30.3  23.2  20.2  13.7  190  132  0.60  0.46
BA = basal area.
CS= carbon storage.
PCI =  Proximity to climax index.Table 6. Repeated  harvesting:  logging behavior  in the presence of royalties  (10 percent  discount  rate).  The indicated values for
the royalties are the highest values that do not induce high-grading.
Logging profit  Government revenue
Royalty  Solution  ($/ha)  ($/ha)
N  ----  --  . . Y ..  .. 
Year 0  Year 60  Year 0  Year 60
None  Harvest D >  30cm dh  4398  -1136  0  0
Harvest 0 > 30 cm dbh
Conventional logging
60-year felling cycle
Volume-based:  Same as above  1809  74  2589  1062
$35/m3
Per tree:  Same as above  3574  587  824  548
$20/tree
Ad valorem:  Same  as above  198  -463  4200  1598
65%  of log priceTable 7. Repeated harvesting: logging behavior in the presence of performance bonds, I (10 percent discount rate).
Performance  Logging profit  Government revenue**  NPV
bond  Logging  behavior  ($/ha)  ($/ha)  ($/ha)
($/m3304i.)*  Year 0  Year 30  - Year60  Year  Year 30  Year 60
Cut D 2 30 cm dbh
None  Cut 0 > 30 cm dbli  4398  0  1136  0  0  0  4402
Conventional logging
Cut D Ž40 cm dbh
55  Cut O 2 40 cm dbh  4019  184  239  0  0  0  4030
Conventional logging  (492)  (438)  (504)
Cut D 2 50 cm dbh
70  Cut O > 50 cm dbh  3517  352  328  0  0  0  3538
Conventional logging  (1241)  (1147)  (1241)
Cut D Ž 60 cm dbh
85  Cut O 2 60 cm dbh  2766  596  547  0  0  0  2802
Conventional logging  (2386)  (2268)  (2318)
* The bond  is linked to the net timber  volume  in trees of commercial  species  witli  0 cmil  < dbhi <  minimium diaileter  culittlig limit.
** T he per-hectare value of the bond is given in parentlhesis. Ilhe  amounit  reimbursed is the dil lerenece  betweell the ligure in
parenthesis and the figure immediately above.Table 8. Repeated harvesting: logging behavior in the presence of performance bonds, 11  (10 percent discount rate).
Performance  Logging profit  Government revenue**  NPV
bond  Logging behavior  ($/ha)  __  ($/ha)  _  _  ($/ha)
($/m3
10_1,m)*  Year 0  Year 30  Year 60  Year 0  Year 30  Year 60
CutD230cmdbh  -__  _  - _  ___  ___-_
None  Cut 0  2 30 cm dbh  4398  0  1136  0  0  0  4402
Conventional logging
Cut D Ž40 cm dbh
51  CutO240cmdbh  3831  142  195  188  42  43  4030
Conventional logging  (961)  (912)  (1078)
Cut D Ž40  cm dbh
56  CutO240cmdbh  3815  103  207  69  16  18  3892
RIL  (1055)  (1130)  (1259)
Cut D2  50 cm dbh
69  Cut O 2 50 cm dbh  3389  225  275  73  20  20  3477
RIL  (1906)  (1989)  (2170)
Cut D  Ž60  cm dbh
84  Cut O 2 60 cm dbh  2558  439  445  73  29  30  2659
RIL  (3190)  (3255)  (3432)
* The bond is linked to the net timber volume in trees of commercial species with 10 cm < dbh < minimum diameter cutting limit.
** The per-hectare value of the bond is given in parenthesis.  The amount reimbursed is the difference between the figure in
parenthesis and the figure immediately above.Table 9. Sequential harvesting:  logging behavior  in the presence of performance-based  renewal  conditions,  performance
bonds, and  royalties (10 percent  discount  rate).
Number  of renewal years (S)  Timber  fees  Bond ($/m3) required  to induce  compliance with cutting  limit of:
60 cm  50 cm  40 ciii
0  None  85  70  55
1  None  38  0  0
2  None  0  0  o
0  Area charge ($1479/ha)  85  70  55
1  Area charge ($1479/ha)  38  0  0
2  Area charge ($1479/ha)  0  0  0
0  Royalty ($20/m 3)  65  50  35
1  Royalty ($20/m 3)  34  0  0
2  Royalty ($20/m 3)  0  0  0
0  Royalty (23%)  62  50  38
1  Royalty (23%)  32  0  0
2  Royalty (23%)  0  0  0Table 1.1. Transition probabilities
Dipterocarps (D)  Commercial non-dipterocarps (0)  Non-commercial (N)
j  Diameter  aj  bj+,  mj  aj  bj+,  mj  aj  bj+,  mj
class
(cm)
1  10-20  0.945  0.022  0.033  0.961  0.012  0.027  0.955  0.012  0.033
2  20-30  0.943  0.036  0.021  0.959  0.022  0.020  0.950  0.017  0.033
3  30-40  0.923  0.052  0.025  0.957  0.025  0.018  0.946  0.015  0.039
4  40-50  0.928  0.047  0.025  0.952  0.021  0.028  0.960  0.031  0.009
5  50-60  0.948  0.035  0.017  0.969  0.024  0.007  0.921  0.018  0.061
6  60-70  0.952  0.044  0.005  0.957  0.034  0.009  0.945  0.023  0.032
7  70+  0.981  0.000  0.019  0.962  0.000  0.038  0.977  0.000  0.023
Source: Boscolo et al. (1997)Table  1.2.  Ingrowth  equations,  by timber  group
Dipterocarps  (D)
Independent variable
Statistics  Constant  basal area (rn 2/ha)  D trees/ha
Coefficient  3.10=a,  -0.10= Pt  0.017=y,
Standard error  0.99**  0.04*  0.004**
R2adj  0.32
Commercial  non-dipterocarps  (0)
Independent variable
Statistics  Constant  basal area (m2/ha)  0  trees/ha
Coefficient  3.84 =  a2  -0.13 = 2  0.017  =  y3
Standard error  1.02**  0.05*  0.008*
R adi  0.09
Non-commercial  (N)
Independenit  variable
Statistics  Constant  basal area (m2/ha)  N trees/ha
Coefficient  13.27  = a 3 -0.30 = ,3  0.01l7  - Y
Standard error  4.14**  0.11*  0.009
S2ou  B  0.15
Source: Boscolo et at. (I1997)Figure 1. Linkages  between  logging  regulations  and management  outcomes
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